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WAITING WITH BROTHER THOMAS

Christopher L. Sagers·
In this Essay, Christopher Sagers argues that those schools of thought that
could be called "doubtful" -that is, those predicated on suspicion of belief to
some degree-share a range of similarities and, more importantly, are attacked
through a set of common criticisms. He argues that the fundamental criticism of
these "doubtful" schools of thought-that doubt leads us to nihilism and therefore
must be bad-is a non sequitur. Furthermore, he continues, we reject doubt not
because it is bad, but because it is difficult. Ultimately, he suggests ways to face
the problems of nihilism or, rather, ways of understanding them as other than
problems.
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INTRODUCTION

Unless I see the mark of the nails on his hands, unless I put my finger
into the place where the nails were, and my hand into his side, I will
never believe it.
1
-The Apostle Thomas
•
Associate, Arnold & Porter, Washington, DC. I wish to thank Mark Brandon, Daniel
Farber, Stanley Fish, Larry Mohr, Richard Posner, Pierre Schlag, Brian Simpson, and most espe·
cially Lane Sagers for comments on earlier drafts. Thanks to Jeff Smith and the two Jims (Dobkin
and Sandman) for support and encouragement.
1.
John 20:25.
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Be prompt and be fair. If you are right, that is a bonus. Leave the
brilliance to us.
2
-Hon. Clay Legrand, Iowa Supreme Court
3

Everybody hates an agnostic. Agnostics drone on with their frus
trating doubts about everything, the most rigorous of them denouncing
anything anyone else has ever done because it all rests on foundations of
belief. A peculiar rash of agnostic talk has invaded the legal academy in
recent years, manifesting itself in various strains of doubtful scholarship
4
5
such as pragmatism, critical legal studies (CLS), the various critical social
2.
Telephone Interview with retired Justice Clay Legrand, Iowa Supreme Court (July 15,
1998) (describing advice Justice Legrand gave to newly appointed Iowa trial court judges).
By "agnostic," I mean simply a person who thinks that we cannot "know" things-facts
3.
or values-in any strict sense. I mean nothing in particular about God per se, although an agnos·
tic, as I use the term, would of course doubt the existence of a god.
A point that will become important later on is that agnosticism is an epistemic claim rather
than an ontological claim. That is, the agnostic merely doubts that we can know things; agnos·
ticism as such makes no claims about what is. Note that this definition makes agnosticism impor·
tantly different than skepticism. The skeptic on my account does make ontological claims-that
things do not exist, that they are not true, etc.
Incidentally, the agnostic makes no claim that agnosticism is "true"-only that we do not
seem to be able to know whether we can know things. I admit somewhat humbly that there is a
point anterior to agnosticism that deserves examination-how we can "know" that we do not
know. I think, though, chat the question is probably irrelevant, for it does not matter to the
agnostic if agnosticism is wrong. Thus, I think that the agnostic can doubt agnosticism. Agnos·
ticism loses none of its usefulness if in fact we can know things because we have yet to figure out
how we can know, if in face such a thing is possible. Thus, we remain in waiting-waiting for
objective truth to make itself manifest. In the meanwhile, we are stuck with doubt and, in my
view, we do not have much choice but to make the best of it. For a further discussion, see infra
Part 11.B.
4.
Pragmatists generally reject the hope of "knowledge" or systematic understanding of the
world. Richard Rorty, for example, rejects the view that there are "essences" or core principles
underlying life. See RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 189-98 (1989).
Similarly, Thomas Grey writes that a pragmatist is "the kind of theorist who constantly puts in
question the status of theory itself and its relation to practice." Thomas C. Grey, Hear the Other
Side: Wallace Stevens and Pragmatist Legal Theory, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1570 (1990).
Pragmatism is currently undergoing an impressive renaissance in American legal thought,
returning from near death and obscurity to become a leading philosophical alternative of the
1990s. See Steven D. Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, JOO YALE L.J. 409, 409-10 (1990) (noting
that, as of the mid-1980s, many scholars had pronounced pragmatism dead, but that by 1990
it had sprung to life); Symposium, The Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63
S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990); Symposium, The Revival of Pragmatism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV.
1 (1996).
5.
See generall:y MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1-14 (1987)
(summarizing the development and general contours of Critical Legal Studies (CLS)). CLS gen·
erally adopted the indeterminacy thesis of legal realism, but went beyond realism to question why
law was indeterminate. According to CLS, legal rules are bad predictors of outcomes because (1)
the rules, by their nature, produce unintended consequences in some cases, and ( 2) the rules are
always in conflict with at least someone's extralegal values. See id. at 40-45 (describing the rules·
standards conflict); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1685 (1976).
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6

theories, and, more recently, the loosely bound "school" or perhaps
7
"collection" of writers who sometimes call themselves "postmodernists."
CLS moved well beyond realism in attempting to live with doubt. The realists as a group
maintained hope that, on the far end of their critique of formalism, there would still be answers to
be found; in this way, CLS scholars felt that many realists were hardly more than formalists them·
selves. See Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A Century of Nightmares and
Noble Dreams, 84 GEO. L.J. 2215, 2215-19 (1996) (reviewing NEIL DUXBURY, PATIERNS OF
AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)). CLS, however, did not attempt. to provide a replacement
for the assumptions it purported to debunk; rather, the goal of the CLS scholar has been continu
ally to remind lawyers and scholars that the problems posed by realism are not subject to real,
black and white answers. See DUXBURY, supra, at 427-28. This goal, however, has led many
within CLS to the difficult and troubling impasse that is the subject of this Essay, and their
attempts to overcome it have led them to the sort of rationalizations to which I object. See infra
notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT
6.
(Kimberle Williams Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CRITICAL RACE THEORY); FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS (0. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993). These critical theories differ from
CLS--their immediate predecessor-in their approach to doubt. For example, much of critical
race theory (CRT) adopts the CLS indeterminacy thesis and its doubtful critique of liberal rights
discourse, but nevertheless it remains important within CRT to find answers to the resulting ques·
tions about normativity and progress. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text. Similarly,
radical feminists reject liberal notions of "rights" and "the state" on the view that the state is not
an objective, neutral actor, but in fact that objectivity and neutrality are merely tools by which a
fundamentally male state maintains an illusion of fairness and thereby maintains its power. See
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurispru
dence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983). Thus, critical social theorists view doubt not so much as an inescap·
able endpoint, but rather as a tool to challenge dominant views. They generally imagine a later
endpoint that is not doubtful-for example, a jurisprudence informed by feminist values. See infra
notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
7.
Postmodernists would probably reject even this attempt to identify legal post·
modernism as an entity. See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END 190 (1995) (stating that to attempt to characterize post·
modernism or capture its core concepts "is contrary to postmodernism, in that [it) falls prey to
modernism"); Pierre Schlag, Stances, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1059, 1059, 1061 (1991) ("Both in the
claims that postmodernists 'are committed' and that they are committed to a 'view,' there is already
a logic that constructs postmodernists as persons who take stances . ..." The claims "raise[) an
intractable problem of privilege among competing positions."). For what it's worth, one scholar
has attempted to isolate certain convictions widely held by postmodernists, a list of which serves
to give at least a flavor of the scholarship:
( l) The self is not, and cannot be, an autonomous, self-generating entity; it is purely a
social, cultural, historical, and linguistic creation. (2) There are no foundational princi·
pies from which other assertions can be derived; hence, certainty as the result of either
empirical verification or deductive reasoning is impossible. (3) There can be no such
thing as knowledge of reality; what we think is knowledge is always belief and can apply
only to the context within which it is asserted. (4) Because language is socially and
culturally constituted, it is inherently incapable of representing or corresponding to real
ity; hence all propositions and all interpretations, even texts, are themselves social
constructions.
Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation,
65 S. CALL. REV. 2505, 2508-09 (1992). It is not terribly clear how postmodernism differs from
CLS and its progeny. Some apparently use the term to encompass CLS and similar approaches,
see, e.g., Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modem Legal Thought: From Langdell and Holmes to
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Agnostics are hardly new to legal scholarship, of course; the frightfully
misnamed legal realists left a legacy of doubt that remains with even most
8
mainstream academics today. Still, today's doubtful scholarship has in turn
9
drawn intense criticism. This is hardly surprising-after all, there doesn't
seem to be much for law professors to do if there is no such thing as a
superior policy choice. Given this recent insurgence of agnostic views, and
the discord they have brought about, it might be useful to examine the
basic commitment uniting them-doubt.
This Essay basically rides two horses. · First, it seeks to show that the
criticisms routinely raised against doubtful legal scholarship are not very
compelling. It seems to me that criticism of doubt is usually predicated on
a lot of gloom and doom-a litany of bad consequences or apparent difficul
ties that do not .necessarily prove much about doubt per se except that it
can seem oftentimes awkward and unlikable. I think it will be useful to try
to collect as many of these various criticisms as possible in one place and
Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353, 354 (1995) ("It would ... be a mistake to conclude that
jurisprudential postmodernism is something that is fundamentally different from jurisprudential
modernism ...."), while others use it to refer to an independent philosophy, see DUXBURY, supra
note 5, at 422. Indeed, a chief difficulty in the debate over postmodernism has concerned what
the word means. See Dale Jamieson, The Poverty of Postmodernist Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV.
577, 577-78 (1991). For the argument that CLS and postmodernism are more than trivially dis
tinct, see DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 422-28.
8.
See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 467 (1988)
(arguing that "[American legal scholars) are all realists now"). Realism was perhaps the best rec
ognized recent occurrence of legal doubt, but was by no means the first. Brian Simpson traces
legal "iconoclasm" to much earlier roots. See A.W.B. Simpson, Legal Iconoclasts and Legal Ideals,
58 U. CIN. L. REV. 819, 828-31 ( 1990) (finding evidence of legal doubt from as early as 1345 and
suggesting that doubt in essence has remained unchanged); see also Don Herzog, As Many as Six
Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 75 CAL. L. REV. 609, 609 (1987) (arguing that CLS merely
restates very old criticisms).
Incidentally, the legal realists are misnamed because they should not be confused with meta
physical realists-those who believe that things exist. The legal realists' metaphysical outlook
seems to have been, if anything, the opposite of that held by metaphysical realists.
9.
See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Death of the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10 (1986)
(arguing that CLS destroys without providing a replacement for what it has destroyed and is thus
"politically unappealing and politically irresponsible"); Jamieson, supra note 7, at 577-83 (arguing
that postmodernism cannot be a useful legal philosophy because its basic tenets are contrary to
theory-building); Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Tum in Modem Theory: A Tum far the
Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871, 873 (1989) (arguing that the new doubtful scholarship has prema
turely interred metaphysics); Dennis Patterson, The Pooeny of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the
Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. l, 3 ( 1993) (arguing that doubt leads to an infinite
regress of interpretations and ultimately leads to hopelessness).
A particularly bitter and now infamous attack came early on, from Dean Paul Carrington. He
wrote that law professors who embrace "nihilism and its lesson that who decides is everything, and
principle is nothing but cosmetic ... [have) an ethical duty to depart the law school, perhaps to
seek a place elsewhere in the academy." Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 222, 227 (1984).
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assess their strengths and weaknesses. Second, and I think more interest
ing, this Essay seeks to show that the fact that these various criticisms of
doubt are unavailing, and therefore that we are left with nihilism, is just
not such a big deal. The problem is not nihilism, but anterior assumptions
of what we need to be able to know and do to survive, to be happy, or
whatever. 10
In what follows I make a few reifications to which many will object.
Most important, I speak of "agnosticism" in a way that is not terribly realis
tic-I generally speak of it as if it were a single philosophical position, while
in fact it is only one component of a number of views widely different both
in their details and in their ultimate prescriptions. The point, however, is
not to defend any of the particular schools manifesting some doubt, but
rather to consider doubt generally and the problems it raises. Because in my
view each of the doubtful branches of legal scholarship share basic com
mitments in common with the others and, more importantly, raise common
problems, it seems useful to speak of them as if they fell under one umbrella,
which I shall call agnosticism or doubt. Furthermore, it seems to me incon
sistent to doubt only some things (and thus the implicit view expressed
in this Essay that the traditional fact-value distinction is unimportant). If
we can't know even the most basic facts-whether we are currently
dreaming, for example-then we are unlikely to do much better at knowing
complicated subjective things like "right" and "wrong." A great deal of this
Essay is taken up with my argument that once one adopts a basic doubtful
approach to knowledge, it is more or less fruitless to try to rehabilitate one
self and try to have faith in some things. Even if that claim is not accepted,
I think it is generally the case that the nonagnostic criticisms that are my
focus apply to incomplete doubt as well as to doubt of everything. For
example, if one is doubtful only about rights or moral values, one is subject
to the same objections of relativism and hopelessness as if he were more
radically doubtful.
One quite separate problem I would like to dispatch up front involves
my use of the term "epistemic." I mean it as nothing more than a con
10.
This observation has been hinted at before, but l don't think anyone has seriously con·
sidered what it means. Joseph Singer recognized that "[r)ather than explain how we can reform
legal theory to solve the problem of nihilism," he would rather "explain why l do not think there
is a problem." Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94
YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1984). Unfortunately, Singer's explanation for why there is no problem depends
on his unsatisfying claim that, notwithstanding the fact that "[l)aw and morality have no rational
foundation," we can nevertheless "develop[) passionate moral and political commitments." Id. at
8-9. Singer was apparently the first legal philosopher to recognize that the real problems of doubt
may not be nihilism. However, in my view, and for the reasons presented in this Essay, l think he
completely failed to understand why.
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venient shorthand expression for what is going on in our minds. In fact,
the only context in which it will arise concerns our capacity. Thus, it is of
precisely no concern to me what "knowledge" is or might be; when I say
that agnosticism is an epistemic view, I do not mean it is a theory of
knowledge. I mean only that it is a claim about what our brains can do and
11
as I have already pointed out below the line, not one that I think is true. I
claim only that whatever knowing is, we can't yet do it in any very absolute
12
sense.
Finally, in contrast to the stubbornly dreary, negative tenor of most
doubtful scholarship, I am determined that this Essay remain cheerful in
tone. Our arrival at doubt does not reflect any underlying hopelessness of
life or anything of the sort. Any sense of hopelessness is merely the product
of a mismatch between our expectations for theory and philosophy, on the
one hand, and our nature, on the other hand. To that end, I should add
here a cautionary word: by no means do I envision a life without hope, nor
do I intend to legitimate any awful activity or misdeed. A careless read of
this Essay will leave one with the impression that I favor complete immor
ality or anarchy or that I am just bent on wrecking tradition for no good
reason. One might also consider me quite a conservative, in that the
inability of knowing right from wrong would tend to render political change
pointless. But, in fact, for purposes of this Essay I only care about one thing:
our epistemic nature and how it affects our various intellectual projects. It
is merely my sense that the simple agnostic observation-that we cannot
know things in any strict sense-has larger implications than is commonly
recognized, and that it cannot be refuted by the various claims that are
commonly made against it.
Part I of this Essay examines agnostic scholarship and considers why
so many doubtful scholars have attempted to construct systematic answers
to the problems of nihilism. It provides a brief explanation of the main
problems of agnosticism, from which I hope it will be apparent that the
similarities amongst the doubtful schools of thought are at least as inter
esting as their differences. This collection of problems, incidentally, is what
I shall mean when I use the term "nihilism." Part I then examines
11.
See supra note 3.
See supra note 3. Thus, though Rorty distrusts "epistemology," he is not talking about
12.
what I'm doing. In fact, I think his purpose and mine are basically the same. He believes that
what is interesting about the way we think (according to him, "hermeneutically") are the con·
clusions we might draw from it about our particular reality rather than how we can build from it a
method for finding truth. See RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE
357-59 (1979). My goal is similar-I am interested in the agnostic observation not for purposes
of what it tells us about truth per se, but for what it tells us about our present circumstances and
the world we face.
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the various attempts by doubtful scholars and others to overcome these
problems. It will seem obvious to some that pure agnosticism must be over
come by such systematic answers, or else we will have failed as philosophers
and will be left with nihilism. My view, however, is that pure agnosticism is
avoided not because it is bad, but because it is difficult.
Part 11 faces the first major class of arguments against doubt-those
that face doubt "on the merits," which is to say that they· attempt to show
that doubt is wrong, for analytical reasons, regardless of its consequences.
They include the so-called "transcendental" arguments and various
attempts to approximate knowledge by doing away with a need for abso
lutes. Part lll considers the second major class of nonagnostic arguments,
which take the form of the reductio ad absurdum. I think the reductio is
generally less well-considered than the more complex arguments discussed
in Part 11, but it is also more important, for reasons that are made clear
below. My general response to the reductio is that just because we want the
world to be a certain way does not mean that it will be. Thus, whether or
not we are left with anything on the other side of the doubtful critique is
not really relevant; I think our goal should not be to overcome nihilism, but
to understand and make the best of it.
Finally, Part IV suggests an approach to the problems of agnostic
ism, or rather a means of understanding them as other than problems. The
key, I think, is to recognize that the real difficulty is not nihilism in itself.
Rather, the problem is a preconceived set of anterior expectations that
require, for their realization, a set of nonnihilistic circumstances. In other
words, we mistakenly assume that it is necessary to our "success" that we be
able to explain things, to come up with right answers, and so on. Thus,
rather than pose a solution that will help us to defeat nihilism, Part IV con
siders whether we can learn to live with it (or whether we already know
how to do that). The opposition to doubt flows from fears of nihilism
predicated on these anterior assumptions and, in particular, on a miscon
ceived notion of the relation between theory and reality. My sense is that if
we discard these misconceptions, nihilism will seem a less-significant
demon.

I.

CLEARING THE UNDERBRUSH

Even if we accept doubt as an epistemic outlook, we must continue
to make personal choices and policy choices. Thus, practical reality seems
to demand that we find some means to make such decisions. Unfortunately,
that means often seems simply unavailable given the commitments already
held by the agnostic. The doubter seeking to work out a systematic phi
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losophy based on agnostic commitments thus often paints himself into the
tight corner of nihilism-his doubt has allowed him critically to examine
existing views, but, having discarded them as inconsistent with doubt, he is
left with nothing. Thus, as Judge Posner said of pragmatism, doubt merely
13
"clears the underbrush; it does not plant the forest."
A.

Difficulties of the Doubter

It is useful to begin by explaining exactly what I understand to be the
problems of the agnostic. Several difficulties arise if one logically follows
the essential agnostic claim to its conclusion-for example, if one begins
with the conviction that we cannot know anything in the strict sense,
then it is hard to see how we can engage in moral criticism or policy
discourse in the traditional manner. The various relevant problems can be
classed together in a group called, to pick a word, nihilism. First let us dis
cuss exactly what they might be. As these problems have been canvassed
extensively elsewhere, the discussion here will be brief.
The first and most intuitively obvious problem is that agnosticism
seems morally hollow. At least according to traditional notions, moral
criticism requires an epistemic commitment not really compatible with pure
doubt-as Joseph Singer put it, the agnostic doubts whether "reason can
14
adjudicate value conflicts." The agnostic is likely to believe that whatever
morality there might be is contingent on geography and history, is sub
jective, and so on. The problem, then, is that the agnostic cannot really say
when things are "good" or "bad" or "right" or "wrong"-at least not in any
15
absolute sense, and absolutes are pretty important to the agnostic. This
has been a common criticism of doubtful legal scholarship and has driven a
great deal of the current animosity towards CLS, the critical social theories,
legal pragmatism, and so on. 16
Second, agnosticism seems to make policymaking basically hopeless.
How can lawmakers make a "right" decision for their constituents if there is
no such thing as a "right" decision? How can a judge possibly anticipate the
consequences of her decision in order to weigh its wisdom as a policy
choice? Will not a policy decision necessarily be an impossible compromise
amongst a basically infinite range of potential choices, each of which has a

13.
Richard A. Posner, What Has Pragmatism to Offer Law?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653,
1670 (1990).
14.
Singer, supra note 10, at 8.
15.
See infra Part II.A.
16.
See sources cited supra note 9.
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precisely equal likelihood of being "right"? It seems that the inherent sub
jectivity of doubt makes policy essentially a shot in the dark that can
neither be objectively approached from the beginning nor objectively
assessed once accomplished.
Similarly, it has been pointed out that by doubting the objectivity of
morals and such, the agnostic wastefully disavows his own value judgments.
This is first of all psychologically damaging for the agnostic-he must live
in a world in which he cannot trust any of his own feelings or decide
whether any of his own deeds is good or bad. Second, the loss is wasteful
because the agnostic, as a member of our democratic community, can con
18
tribute nothing to the general cause of public debate.
On a related but basically trivial point, agnosticism seems to make our
other everyday decisions look a little silly. Taken to its absurd extreme, a
commitment to rigorous doubt would require that we doubt everything-for
example, that the sun will rise in the East tomorrow morning, or that car
rots will taste good the next time (or that they did the last time, for that
matter), and so on, so that an agnostic true to his own principles would be
best advised to stay at home under the covers. (Witness John Barth's very
funny account of a man paralyzed at a train station because all alternative
destinations struck him as equally desirable.) 19 Of course, no one doubts
everything and no one could. We operate every day on an apparently infi
nite number of assumptions about the world, at varying levels of con
sciousness, and without them we would be hopelessly a-sea. One might ask
whether our basically belief-ridden state is compatible with agnosticism and
whether it undermines that viewpoint-that is a subject for consideration
later on. 20
Finally, and probably most controversially, I think traditional notions
of theory are frustrated by doubt. By "theory," I mean something very broad.
To borrow a phrase, I intend theory to mean attempts to use the world's
redundancies to explain the world simply. 21 That is, a theory implicitly
claims that there are principles or commonalities underlying some certain
class of events that can explain the broader system of those events in com
17.
Under that view, interestingly enough, the likelihood of any choice being "right"
is precisely zero. See FREDERICK MOSTELLER ET AL., PROBABILITY WITH STATISTICAL APPLI·
CATIONS 251 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining that the probability of randomly selecting any particular
point along a continuum of continuous random variables is zero).
18.
See Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 1061, 1062-63.
See JOHN BARTH, THE END OF THE ROAD 322-37 (Anchor Books ed. 1988). Barth
19.
aptly calls the man's condition "cosmopsis"-literally, the state of seeing everything. Id.
20.
See infra Part Ill.
21.
See Herbert A. Simon, The Architecture of Complexity, 21 J. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 23,
27 (1963 ).
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pact terms. A theory, then, is perhaps like an algorithm that purports to
capture some of the underlying structure of reality, or like a recipe that can
explain in brief the operation or making of something larger and more
complex than the recipe itself. Incidentally, when seen in this way the
term "theory" encompasses a number of things we don't normally think of
as theories-legal doctrine, for example. As this is a point of some signifi
22
cance to this Essay, it receives a somewhat more detailed treatment here.
Theories, from the agnostic perspective, suffer from a whole host
of problems, all of them calling into question the reliability of our observa
tions and the conclusions we draw from them. Most simply, there is a logi
cal disconnect between observation and reality that jeopardizes our ability
to identify even those basic relationships upon which theory seeks to build.
If a theory is the use of the world's redundancies to explain the world sim
ply, an initial question is whether we have the cerebral wattage to identify
the redundancies properly. It is unclear whether we can reliably identify
the similarities that could render facts "redundant."
A closely related problem is that theories contain an unresolveable
chicken-and-egg confusion: our theories might actually be driving our
observations. As Pierre Schlag has explained, there is a serious circularity
in the basic argument that "I observe X causing Y, and therefore X causes
Y. "23 That is, if we hypothesize that X causes Y, then it may be only natural
that things Y always seem to follow our observation of things X. On the
other hand, if we hypothesize that Y causes X, our observations might be
substantially different-even opposite. So, the question is whether our
observations occur independently of what we hope to observe. As Francis
Bacon long ago put it:
The human understanding, once it has adopted opinions, either
because they were already accepted and believed, or because it likes
them, draws everything else to support and agree with them. And
though it may meet a greater number and weight of contrary
instances, it will, with great and harmful prejudice, ignore or con
demn or exclude them by introducing some distinction, in order that
the authority of those earlier assumptions may remain intact and
24
unharmed.
22.
For an explanation of the significance, see infra Part lV.B.
See Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 900-02 (1997)
23.
(explaining that, in theory making, "[a) certain pattern is abstracted from the data .... [and) then
projected back onto imagined reified enabling agencies-such as 'doctrines' and 'principles' [and
these) enabling agencies are then ... quite fortuitously ... found to be at once generative of and
constraining upon" those same data).
24.
FRANCIS BACON, NOVUM 0RGANUM 57 (Peter Urbach & John Gibson eds. & trans.,
Open Court 1994) (1620).
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A more fundamental difficulty with theories could be called the "struc
ture problem." This is best understood if we think of theory as something
like an outline. An outline restates the structure of the thing in question
and makes simplified representations about its content. It is an attempt to
represent the thing without simply reproducing the whole thing. A trivial
agnostic observation is that an outline may be incomplete-we can never
tell if we have gone into enough detail in an outline to really have reached
the atomic level of analysis. If that were the only problem, we might think
it possible- to perfect the outline by merely making it more detailed, and, in
any case, we should be able to make it complete enough that whatever
minor ways in which it disagrees with reality are so inconsequential as to
make the outline perfect for practical purposes. But the problem with the
outline is not that it may not contain every necessary element. The prob
lem is that, along with its claim about the content of the phenomenon
under consideration, the outline contains an implicit claim about the
phenomenon's organization. An outline necessarily contemplates that some
particular set of facts is organized in a pyramid or hierarchy of components
that are related to one another only through the hierarchy. There is the
title, which is the most general statement of commonality of the
components, and then there are the headings, which are the next level, and
so on. For this reason, an outline would clearly be inadequate to explain,
say, international warfare. Such a phenomenon cannot be understood as
a pyramid-like outline because the relevant facts have complicated
interrelationships that cannot be characterized by simple vertical chains of
decreasing specificity. In other words, the problem with the outline is that
it hypothesizes an inherent set of relationships that is anterior even to our
observations-when we set about trying to make an outline, we have
assumed a certain organization even before we begin.
Finally, the most fundamental element of the "structure" problem is
that the outline, to continue the example, assumes that there are "atoms,"
so to speak, to be found. That is, it quietly assumes that, at the fundamen
tal level of analysis, there are finite, identifiable points of truth on which
the outline can be built. We assume that our categorization of observations
into such "facts" is not arbitrary or questionable, but simply a realistic
understanding of the units of reality.
I think theory generally is quite like the outline. While a theory does
not necessarily have to be a hierarchical pyramid, it does make organiza
tional claims about reality. Consider a simple theory: "When an object falls
in a vacuum, it accelerates at a constant rate." This claim is a theory
because it makes a generalized argument about the redundancies of some
class of events, and the argument is thought to explain every set of facts
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that falls within the class. This particular theory contains obvious claims
about the factual content of the phenomenon under consideration, and such
claims can be measured with great precision in replications of the experi
ment. But notice that the theory also contains subtle claims about the
organization of those facts, including the most basic claim that the "facts"
themselves exist as finite, atomic-level organizational units. First of all,
there is the most general claim about commonality-that there is a class of
things called "matter." More specifically, the theory claims that all items
within that class exist in space, that they are all acted upon by gravity, and
so on. Incidentally, it is this structural component of theories that, if reli
able, represents their most valuable contribution: They purport to allow us
to predict, by extension, the operation of phenomena not observed in any
particular experiment. We infer from our research that other phenomena
captured within the theory will behave as the theory predicts, even though
we have not directly observed them.
Now consider a more complicated theory: "Humans on average tend to
behave as rational maximizers and will make choices that pose the greatest
value to them in terms of their own desires, taking into consideration all
costs of such choices." Again, this is a theory because it attempts to isolate
the controlling elements of some class of events-namely, human decision
making-and therefore to restate the workings of those events in highly
simplified form. Again, note how the theory subtly imposes structure on
the relevant sets of facts that might not actually be there. The theory is an
implicit claim that there is a class called humans who are in all relevant
respects the same. All members of the class share a degree of self-interest,
they satisfy it in similar ways, and want similar things. This is again a classi
fication of things-the imposition of order on facts and an assumption that
there are facts or "atoms," rather than a creation of such pigeonholes by our
organizational faculties. Its value if reliable is that we could understand
events without actually observing them. Thus arises the agnostic problem,
however, if indeed the agnostic is right: we can't know if there really is such
an underlying structure, we can't know how well we are able to make use of
it if it exists, and we can't know how much if any reliability it might have.
Thus, the structure problem with theories is not the minor one of our
inability to squeeze everything into them, but the major one of our organiza
tional assumptions. Even if there is some underlying substance or redun
dancy, the elements of which we can adequately state, we seem able to
theorize only in this one, structurally engrafted way-according to one
general scheme of organization-and we cannot really know that the world
is organized in that way. Morton Horwitz summarized this view as applied
to legal scholarship when he said "[t)he subversive assault [on] traditional
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theories of law" has caused doubtful scholars to "focus[] upon the classi
fication and · categorization of ... phenomena and [to] conclud[e]
that ... [b]ecause there are no 'natural classes,' the process of categorization
and classification is a social creation, not an act reflecting some prior
. . of nature. 1125
orgamzatton
Incidentally, it should be noted that this structure problem, as I
describe it, is closely akin to a criticism that has become common among
pragmatists, literary critics, many continental philosophers, and others con
cerned with problems of "interpretation." To take an example familiar to
legal readers, Judge Posner has explained that "practical reason," by which
he seems to mean "the way we in fact understand the world," does not par
ticipate directly in reality, but rather accumulates observations (themselves
questionable) and draws conclusions from them that are not provable.
Noting that "[t]he brain imposes structure on our perceptions, so that, for
example, we ascribe causal significance to acts without being able to
observe ... causality," he explains that "intuition is the body of our bedrock
beliefs: the beliefs that lie so deep that we do not know how to question
them; the propositions that we cannot help believing and that therefore
. for reasoning.
. 1126
supp ly t h e premises
Judge Posner apparently feels that this observational superstructure is
not capable of arriving at objectivity and suggests that whatever objectivity
there may seem to be in the world is an illusion. "[P]olitical consensus," he
writes, "[is] but a polite name for the will of the stronger," and therefore
"there is something odd about using political agreement to ground episte
27
mological confidence." With regard to law, he points out that because
"[r]ules make dichotomous cuts in continuous phenomena," a rule "sup
28
presses potentially relevant circumstances of the dispute." In other words,
whatever formal objectivity legal rules may have rests on a mismatch
between our ability to make rules-that is, our ability to describe classes of
events and to say what is redundant about them-and the phenomena they
attempt to constrain.
25.
Morton J. Horwitz, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Funda
mentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 32, 33 (1993).

26.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 73 (1990).
27.
Id. at 126.
28.
Id. at 44-46. By "continuous," I take Posner to be drawing a quantitative analogy. In
statistics, a basic distinction is made between "discrete" random variables-that is, those phenom
ena that could be counted in units-and "continuous" random variables-those that cannot
be counted because the "units" are infinitely small. See MOSTELLER ET AL., supra note 17, at 251.
Thus, Posner means that the "facts" before a judge or legislator are infinitely "small" or complex,
but the best we can come up with intellectually is a set of rules that would be better suited to
dealing with discrete random variables.
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Similarly, Stanley Fish has explained at great length that our ability to
interpret and understand the world is seriously undermined by the means
29
we use to go about it. Fish has noted that we do not "interpret" by way of
unfiltered observations of reality and rational conclusions drawn from those
observations.Jo Rather, by our membership in "interpretive communities,"
we take part in a fully mediated experience, and the various intellectual
devices that do the mediating put the reliability of our observations in
doubt. Fish defines interpretive community very carefully:
[le is] not so much a group of individuals who share[] a point of view,
but a point of view or way of organizing experience that share[s]
individuals in the sense that its assumed distinctions, categories of
understanding, and stipulations of relevance and irrelevance [are] the
content of the consciousness of community members who [are]
therefore no longer individuals, but, insofar as they [are] embedded in
the community's enterprise, community property.Ji

The practical and political consequences of being so "shared" by an
interpretive community are, from the nonagnostic perspective, bleak.
There is no such thing as "reason," at least not as an overarching adjudica
tor of competing propositions. The primacy of reason necessarily assumes
an opposition between reason and belief because, if rationality itself is
merely another belief, it would rest on a basis no firmer and no less subject
co dispute than the beliefs upon which it purports to rule. According to
Fish, the assumption is provided for us by our various interpretive commu
2
nities, and all such assumptions are contestable.J
The fundamental point drawn by Posner, Fish, and many others, then,
is chat an assumption of objectivity or reliability surrounds the conclusions
we draw from our observations, but that such an assumption is dubious.
First, our conclusions are driven by a particular set of organizational devices
that are not in fact objective or "true," but are privileged above others that
are no less deserving. Further, our very ability to identify "facts" is dubious
because we identify them according to questionable techniques and ante
rior assumptions. I have adopted the "structure" terminology here because
it avoids difficult technical points and, to me, makes clear how broadly

29.
30.
31.

See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 338-55 (1980).
See id.
STANLEY FISH, DOINO WHAT COMES NATURALLY 141 (1989). On the hazards of

misinterpreting Fish's terms of art-and most importantly the term "interpretive community"
see Stanley Fish, How Come You Do Me Like You Do? A Response to Dennis Patterson, 72 TEX. L.

REV. 57 (1993).
32.
See Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997, 998.
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these problems of observation and theoretical reasoning cut in law and
elsewhere. 33
B.

Planting the Forest

Thus, the agnostic arrives at a point of some difficulty. Once he has
cleared Judge Posner's underbrush without knowing where to go from there,
the situation is one of nihilism as described in Part I.A. It seems that it is
planting the forest that has led to the whole series of philosophical posi
tions that I class under the general rubric "agnostic" or "doubtful." These
views may differ greatly in their details and prescriptions, but I think they
really differ only in degree with respect to their underlying doubtful claims.
It is my sense that the surface differences are not terribly important; they
are primarily the residue of the agnostic philosopher's attempt to rationalize
away these various problems of nihilism.
An example that helps to make this apparent is the rejection by criti
cal race theory (CRT) of many of the basic conclusions of its intellectual
forebear, CLS. CLS generally took a stridently doubtful tack, leaving some
with the impression ~hat, according to CLS, "there are no right answers." 34
This was quite problematic for CRT scholars (and for many CLS adherents
35
as well) because it left them with nothing on which to base. arguments for
the social reform central to their project.
In particular, CLS rejected the liberal democratic ideal that individu
als have "rights" and that these rights are given substantive content by lib
eral political philosophy. On the contrary, says CLS, the "liberal rights
discourse" in fact simply constructs individuals and their own conceptions

33.
Note that this "structure" problem could probably also be cabined in the more familiar
terms of the conceptualist-realist debate over universals. The agnostic, doubting his ability to
identify or make use of universals, shuns attempts-such as "theory"-to do so. Within this
debate the agnostic takes a position akin to nominalism. As I explain the problem, the agnostic
doubts even the usefulness or existence of"facts"-that is, he questions not only the availability of
universals but also of "particulars." For a good explanation of the debate and the nominalist view,
see RORTY, supra note 12, at 17-32.
I avoid the language of that debate, however, for two reasons. First, it is metaphysical in
nature, and because metaphysics is simply irrelevant to this Essay it will be well to avoid the
numerous tedious {and unimportant) problems that come with it. Second, the debate entails a
fair amount of technical terminology, and I think the "theory" language adopted above helps to
make the importance of this view for law and legal scholarship more transparent.
34.
DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 427-28.
35.
See infra notes 43-45 and accompanying text; see also Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 661-62 (1983) (claiming that, in the end,
CLS can provide a "constructive program").
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of what they deserve. In this way the state can merely observe the formal
ity of protecting rights, thus maintaining an appearance of fairness, and
thereby preserve its power while perpetrating harms against individuals
within it. Therefore, to fight for "rights" within the liberal political struc
ture, even if one wins short-term victories, is ultimately to legitimate an
inherently imbalanced and unequal regime. 37
Unfortunately, this critique left CRT scholars with no normative basis
on which to advocate minority interests or oppose oppression. CLS,
because of its doubtful claim, could not provide a coherent criticism of
racial oppression; in the end, "the very terms used to proclaim victory
contain[ed] within them the seeds of defeat." 38 Thus, the problem for criti
cal race theorists was to find some way to accept the CLS critique of rights
and yet still argue that the "rights" of minorities should be advanced-that
is, to find some normative basis for their philosophy.
Numerous CRT scholars have attempted to find this basis, and the
results have been decidedly nonagnostic. For example, Mari Matsuda finds
it in the case of Japanese internment camp victims. 39 The fact that the
prisoners at once believed that their government had wronged them and yet
maintained faith in their rights under the Constitution is evidence, she
says, that we can both doubt prevailing political discourse and yet believe in
transcendent values of humanity that require equality and an end to oppres
sion. Thus, the experience of the powerless can inform our normativity and
can do so, says Matsuda, in a way that is not subject to doubtful critique.
Similarly, Anthony Cook looks for a "reconstitutive vision" in the ethical
teachings of Martin Luther King. 40 He writes that King's "Critical Theol
ogy," by way of its definition of individuals as entities that strive for justice
(even if they cannot totally succeed), provides a normative foundation for
arguments against oppression. 41 The individual, he writes, is always in the
36.
See Pierre J. Schlag, Empty Circles of Liberal Justification, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2-6
(1997) (describing the process by which "constitutional mythology" constructs our notion of our
own rights).
See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 6, at xx-xxv; Kimberle Williams
37.
Crenshaw, Race, Refarm, and Retrenchment: Transfarmation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1334, 1356-66 (1988).
38.
Crenshaw, supra note 37, at 1347.
See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22
39.
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 338-42 (1987).
40.
See Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies: The Reconstructive Theology of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990) [hereinafter, Cook, Beyond Critical Legal
Studies); see also Anthony E. Cook, The Death of God in American Pragmatism and Realism: Resur
recting the Value of Love in Contemporary Jurisprudence, 82 GEO. L.J. 1431, 1431 (1994) (arguing for
"a revitalization of an explicitly normative discourse about the common good").
41.
See Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies, supra note 40, at 986-88.
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process of "becoming"; our "essential nature" lies in the struggle for "jus
tice."42 Thus, the doubter's frustrating claim that we cannot succeed is
apparently overcome because it is still worthwhile to try. In this way, the
difficult implications of doubt-in this case, that systematic solutions to the
problem of racial oppression will not be forthcoming-have led CRT schol
ars to grope about for answers or explanations, rather than accept the
awkward possibility that overarching answers and explanations do not exist.
The latter possibility seems to them like a failure.
Thus, even though they may not so claim explicitly, doubtful legal
philosophers often seem still possessed of the hope of finding a systematic
normativity. That is, even while various writers admit that there is no
"truth" or that humans have no access to it, they still seek to construct solu
tions to public problems of administration and private problems of morality
and personal choices.
This is so even of many adherents to CLS and postmodernism. For
example, J.M. Balkin claims that deconstruction does not lead to moral
relativity because it is merely a process by which we assess the inadequacy of
human conventions-not the values underlying them. In a move not unlike
that of Anthony Cook, Balkin writes that values can exist-transcendental
values-that remain forever inchoate (that is, we may never reach them
through our various conventions, but we serve them in striving for them). 43
Similarly, Stephen Feldman argues that postmodernism does not.reject "jus
tice" even though justice may be socially constructed. Justice does not lose
its usefulness by way of construction because our entire existence-our
"being-in-the-world," borrowing from Heidegger-is constructed. There
fore, things that are constructed are still ontologically real, in a way.44 Even
Pierre Schlag has let slip that if we examine mainstream scholarship in the
proper critical manner, "we might [arrive at] an understanding of what 'law'
45
is and how 'law' maintains itself," suggesting, perhaps, that there is a light
at the end of the doubtful tunnel.
Even radical pragmatists, who probably go furthest in examining the
practical implications of doubt, have sought guiding principles or wisdom to
aid in navigating life and policy. Richard Rorty, for example, takes an
extremely doubtful view. He argues that doubt leads ultimately to a rejec
42.
Id. at 1028-30.
43.
See J.M. Balkin, Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1131, 1176-83 ( 1994 ); id. at 1139 (stating that "transcendent values," including justice, arise from
"the wellsprings of the human soul," which transcend "the creations of culture").
44.
See Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REV.
166, 197-201 (1996).
45.
Pierre Schlag, Writing for Judges, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419, 423 (1992).
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tion of traditional philosophical approaches altogether; as he put it, he has
no interest in replacing existing theory with his own metaphysics or episte
mology, but rather "would simply like to change the subject."46 He would
advocate no systematic claims at all about what exists or what we can
know. 47 Nevertheless, realizing that his pragmatism is basically quite banal
48
in that it cannot serve as a guide in actual decision making, Rorty still
imagines that normative substance will be derived from the "romantic" and
"visionary" writings of poets and philosophers, which ·justify judicial "leaps
in the dark," even when they "roil ... the political waters." 49 Rorty says
"visionary" advice is gotten, for example, from "Dewey the prophet rather
than Dewey the pragmatist philosopher."50 Rorty, though, must still admit
that "equally romantic and visionary, yet morally appalling, decisions may
be made by pragmatist judges." His only response is to say that "I do not
believe that legal theory offers us a defense against such judges-that
51
it can do much to prevent another Dred Scott decision." His approach,
then, is ultimately banal-while he hopes to find some normative sub
stance, it seems that under his commitments that substance can only ever
52
be an illusion.
Similarly, Judge Posner, who in recent years has taken on the fairly
53
extreme pragmatism described above, has attempted to define a "pragmatic
46.
RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM xiv (1982); cf. RORTY, supra
note 4, at 189-98 (arguing that there are no "essences" or principles underlying life). For a sum
mary introduction to Rorty's work, see Moore, supra note 9, at 892-905 and Singer, supra note 10.
47.
See RORTY, supra note 46, at 165.
48.
See Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1811, 1811 (1990).
Id. at 1817-19.
49.
50.
Id. at 1815.
Id. at 1818.
51.
See also Grey, supra note 4 (finding similar normative substance in the poetry of
52.
Wallace Stevens). Rorty suggests elsewhere that pragmatism is normatively positive because it
necessarily leads to greater tolerance (a value that is left to the reader to agree is good). Rorty
writes that, "[i]n the end, the pragmatists tell us, what matters is our loyalty to other human beings
clinging together against the dark, not our hope of getting things right." RORTY, supra note 46, at
166. On a strictly personal level, I am partial to that sentiment, I suppose, but, as Stanley Fish
points out, Rorty's tolerance value is reached only through a decidedly nonpragmatic methodol
ogy. Such a methodology is at odds with Rorty's premises because it depends on rationalized,
pre-determined values (tolerance) and skills or methods (the practice of tolerance) that precede
real-life situations. See Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1447, 1465-67 (1990). Furthermore, Rorty assumes that there can be a privileged
value-tolerance-which may strike one as compelling or desirable, but which is nevertheless
indefensible in the face of criticisms Rorty himself puts forward. This tolerance value, then, also
fails to rescue Rorty from his apparent fear that nihilism is an unacceptable endpoint.
53.
See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. For a quick overview of Judge Posner's
current position, see RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 29 (1995) (advocating "living
without foundations"); POSNER, supra note 26, at 454-69 (setting out a "Pragmatist Manifesto"
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theory of adjudication." 54 Under this program, "'a pragmatist judge always
tries to do the best he can do for the present and the future, unchecked
by any felt duty to secure consistency in principle with what other officials
55
have done in the past."' Thus, primary concern is focused on the facts
of individual cases and reliance on positive law is required only insofar
as the values of uniformity and predictability outweigh other values. The ulti
mate goal is simply "reasonableness." This is defensible, he says, because
the pragmatic judge is only seeking to "produc[e] the best results for the
56
future." Thus, Judge Posner's ideal model of judging is "for judges to con
ceive of their task, in every case, as that of striving to reach the most
reasonable result in the circumstances ... substituting the humble, fact
bound, policy-soaked, instrumental concept of 'reasonableness' for both
57
legal and moral rightness."
It is not particularly difficult to see the
problems with that "theory," however, 58 and they are particularly ironic,
59
given much of Judge Posner's earlier work. My point here, of course, is not

predicated on the beliefs that "there is no such thing as 'legal reasoning,"' that there "are no
moral 'reals,"' and that hard cases cannot be decided objectively if "objectivity" is different than
"reasonableness").
54.
See POSNER, supra note 26, at 24-33; Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18
CAROOZO L. REV. l (1996).
55.
Posner, supra note 54, at 4.
56.
Id. at 4; see also id. at 7-8.
57.
POSNER, supra note 26, at 130. For reasons that are difficult to encapsulate in a short
note, Judge Posner suggests that this pragmatic jurisprudence could be constrained to an extent
by-alas-microeconomics. See id. at 387-92. However, I think Judge Posner has a difficult task
to show why economic "rules" are any more determinate than the legal "rules" he so powerfully
criticizes, especially given his own observation that "economic theory has become so rich, so
complex, that almost any hypothesis, even one that appeared to deny a fundamental implication
of the theory such as the law of demand, could be made to conform to the theory." Id. at 363-64
(noting the example of the "Giffen good," which becomes more desirable as its price increases).
Furthermore, as Fish explains, there is a seriously problematic irony in setting out powerful
agnostic criticisms of the sort Posner adopts and then trying to rehabilitate oneself through an
essentialist crutch like economics. See Fish, supra note 52, at 1460-62.
58.
Indeed, Judge Posner sets out even those limited guidelines to allay criticisms that his
approach "endorses a visceral, personalized, rule-less, free-wheeling, unstructured conception of
judging." Posner, supra note 54, at 3. This was his response specifically to the remarks of Jeffrey
Rosen. See Jeffrey Rosen, Overcoming Posner, 105 YALE L.J. 581, 584-96 (1995).
59.
The irony is that Posner's theory falls prey to the same problems that caused him so
roundly to reject utilitarianism-a predecessor of law and economics-earlier in his career. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). In The Economics of]ustice, he dis·
misses utilitarianism as "spongy and' nonoperative" because it was beset by problems of indetermi·
nacy, and because it was so manipulable that it could easily legitimate "moraLmonsters," like mass
murder, so long as they could be said to maximize aggregate happiness. See id. at 51-58. But
"pragmatic adjudication" is similarly a spongy nonphilosophy that is sufficiently manipulable
to justify essentially any judicial decision. As Jeffrey Rosen writes, pragmatic adjudication "is
nothing more than a license for judges to ventilate their personal instincts." Rosen, supra note 58,
at 589.
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to vilify Judge Posner; it is merely that even legal thinkers willing to sacri
fice belief in anything tend to find themselves groping for philosophical
answers to the problems of doubt, and Judge Posner's is yet another case in
60
which it seems that the solution is simply no solution.
These various attempts to overcome the apparently intractable prob
lems of doubt suggest that, maybe, nihilism is just a natural consequence of
our limitations as humans. We simply cannot seem to overcome doubt by
way of principled arguments or theories, unless you define principles in such
a relative or nonsystematic way that you have begged the question whether
they exist. Naturally, we want very much to describe right and wrong, good
and bad, and, for that matter, everything else in ways that will be useful to
us as people and policymakers. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that
there simply is no means to repair the damage done by doubt. Thus, it
seems that even the most doubtful of agnostics typically hide from the
awkward possibility of nihilism: we simply cannot evaluate our choices or
our environment in any meaningful way. But if we begin to think like that,
the fear sets in that we face a basically aphilosophical and pragmatic
existence. This fear-and the arguments that arise from it-are the subject
of the remainder of this Essay.

II.

FACING DOUBT ON THE MERITS

Numerous attempts exist by mainstream philosophers to show that we
can in fact know things-that is, to confront doubt as an epistemic position
and, in some cases, to provide a compelling alternative. As lawyers are a
fairly pragmatic lot, it is only natural that in legal scholarship it has been
more common to oppose doubt according to the reductio claim, which will
be discussed in Part Ill. Nevertheless, other arguments have been raised,
and some authors have even set out arguments purporting to show how we
60.
This criticism-that even doubters tend to argue for policy and moral solutions that are
at odds with doubt-was apparently first raised in legal thought by Roscoe Pound in response
to legal realism. See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV.
697 (1931).
Incidentally, there are those scholars who seem to accept nihilism and remain untroubled.
For example, Sanford Levinson writes that his work-which he calls "metatheory," or scholarship
that is about "first-order" theory written from a "second-order" perspective-will never propose
solutions or advice for resolution of real disputes or formulation of real policy. See Sanford
Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-Theory (Or, Why, and to Whom, Do I Write the
Things I Do?). 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 389, 398-403 (1992). That is simply not an interesting role
for the law professor in Levinson's world. The problem, however, is that one is still left asking
"now what?'' Levinson's approach may be "right," insofar as it may prove interesting and useful,
but he does not (and could not) argue that the question of how we should act goes away simply
because he doesn't care about it.
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can know things. Clearly such a mechanism is necessary to certain legal
philosophies-natural law, for instance-when otherwise severe problems
of epistemology would render the entire scheme useless. This Part faces the
most important general arguments and explains why they really pose no
solution to the agnostic's simple observation that we don't seem to know
how to know things.
A.

No Need for Absolutes

The agnostic's sometimes frustrating emphasis on the impossibility of
absolutes has led to a common and quite thoughtful argument. Its pro
ponent will generally concede the basic agnostic observation, but then
complain that the agnostic asks too much of the world by demanding
absolutes and then proclaiming, when he shows that there are none, that
agnosticism must be right. 61 Indeed the nonagnostic is right to say that just
because some value or idea is not absolute does not mean it is therefore any
less real. The nonagnostic will thus argue that even if we can't know things,
we can still make use of beliefs or whatever, and that the agnostic should
62
therefore be willing to compromise.
There is undoubtedly something to this argument. Clearly, it is a good
picture of how we in fact live-no one goes about their daily business trying
63
to doubt everything, for it would be both impossible and ridiculous. With
a little thought, however, it is apparent how important a critique doubt is
when aimed at intellectual projects. I for one think that its significance for
academia, and especially the social sciences, simply cannot be overstated.
The nonagnostic in this instance is essentially saying that the doubtful
observation is a banal one. This argument thus raises the question of
whether there is any point in writing papers such as the present one, and,
indeed, whether there is any point in pursuing the agnostic view.
Intellectual projects by their nature always, at least implicitly, contain
certain claims of first philosophy. Academic projects, in particular, usually
contain strong ones. For example, when a law professor writes a paper
arguing for a particular policy outcome, he will implicitly claim that there is
some degree of ontological reality to "good" and "bad," that theory is reli
61.
Not everyone, incidentally, thinks the argument is so thoughtful. See PIERRE J.
SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (forthcoming 1998) (arguing that the requirement
of absolutes does not arise from the agnostic, but rather from the need of the nonagnostic to dis·
tinguish objective ways of knowing from mere faith or prejudice).
See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 8, at 842; see also Singer, supra note 10, at 59 (quoting
62.
Hans Meyerhoff for the proposition that "we should reject the idea that '[e)ither philosophy is the
Truth (with a capital T) or it is nothing-(or it is 'Sophistry')"').
63.
See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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able, that there are identifiable values, and that it is within his power to
identify and evaluate them. Indeed, any argument assumes that there are
values of which we can make use, because implicit in the argument is the
claim that it would be better for the reader to agree than tc;> disagree. In
other words, a scholarly project necessarily contains a range of more or less
implicit metaphysical claims. However, agnosticism is an epistemic issue
that is necessarily anterior to and undercuts all metaphysics-it is the ques
tion whether or not we have the capacity to verify any of our metaphysical
conclusions.
Still, one might not think that that problem in itself is so important.
The nonagnostic might take a position like this: We could define a new
word "know*" to mean that we know* a proposition when affirming it is "a
useful compromise with our circumstances" or is part of a "view of our situa
tion that at present makes the most sense of our experience," or language to
that effect. In other words, one could simply make a new word that lowers
the threshold criteria for the reliability of our observations. The non
agnostic might claim that for practical purposes "know" and "know*" are
precisely the same thing, and that if one quietly replaced "know" with
"know*" in every circumstance in which we use that term, it would in fact
have no effect on how we live our lives. Therefore, one might say that the
agnostic's point that we can't "know" should have no effect on scholarship
or law. 61
My response is two-fold. First, the distinction between "know" and
"know*" matters significantly in the following very concrete sense. If a per
son admits that the best we can do is "know*," then he admits that every
truth claim "X" must actually, implicitly mean "I think X, even though I
can't prove it." If he then engages in ongoing debate with other people in
which he says "I think X, even though I can't prove it," and another person
responds "Well, I think Y, even though I can't prove it," and another says,
"Well, I think Z, even though I can't prove it," then what you have is
not so much a search for "truth" or right answers or anything of that sort,
but rather a slightly bizarre forum containing nothing but each person's
report on his own inner status.
The basic agnostic criticism of this situation, therefore, is that by
engaging in debate at all, the parties have begged what seems like a pretty
important anterior question: whether there is any value to the claim, "I
think X, even though I can't prove it." That is, if a person can say only

64.
See E-mail from Daniel A. Farber, Professor, University of Minnesota, to Christopher
L. Sagers, Attorney, Arnold & Porter (June 30, 1998) (on file with author) (setting out the argu
ment presented in the text).
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what he thinks, is there any reason to pay attention? What if another per
son thinks exactly the opposite? Who's right? Do either of them gain by
reporting to each other the dissonance between their instincts? Which one
deserves to have the world accept his report on the status of his inner feel
ings? This is the reason that legal discourse or debate generally so fills the
agnostic with ennui and, incidentally, also explains why legal scholarship is
so easy for the world to disregard.
The second reason to believe doubt matters is more esoteric but more
moving (in my mind). Both the plausibility and apparent significance of
doubt depend a lot on the altitude from which one views the world. When
we operate in the everyday mode-when we see the world from sea level, as
it were-in which we are concerned with the bills we have to pay, the reply
brief that was just served on a client, or what to have for lun~h, agnosticism
looks pretty silly. We each operate on useful beliefs (for example, we
know* that the sun will come up tomorrow, we know* right from wrong),
and we get along just fine without questioning ourselves.
But, on the other hand, if you step back a little and consider how
much we know (or even know*) about ourselves and the world around us
as Nietzsche might say, when you look at the world from the top of a
mountain-you might make a few observations like this: ( 1) humans appear
to be here by accident; (2) our morals and our beliefs and our knowledge*
might just be evolutionary tricks, like our epiglottis, which keeps us from
choking to death; and, most importantly, (3) we exist in a universe that is
perhaps infinitely vast, that might go on for billions or trillions of years after
we are extinct, and that was here billions of years before our earliest
ancestral chain of RNA had even formed in the water. For what it is worth,
65
we appear to be a momentary flash in the pan.
When you consider human insignificance on this scale, you not only
gain humility and circumspection, you also begin to wonder about things
like whether there is any point to people bitterly disputing, say, the parol
evidence rule. That is, our relative insignificance and our apparently acci
dental nature, coupled with our epistemic inability, throw all of our values
and beliefs into doubt. It suddenly seems much less compelling that we
66
cannot dispose of our everyday beliefs. Thus, from this perspective, it

65.
Levi-Strauss expressed this sentiment more simply but most powerfully when he said
that "[t)he world began without man and will end without him." CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS,
TRISTES TROPIQUES 413 (John Weightman & Doreen Weightman trans., Penguin Books
1992) (1955 ).
66.
See infra Part Ill and accompanying text. As I explain below, I think that inability is a
major reason that doubt is so difficult for many people to accept.
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makes a lot more sense to give doubt the time of day, and to be suspicious of
claims like, "I think X, even though I can't prove it."
A distinction might be made here with which I would not disagree.
As Rorty explains, a person can make "edifying," as opposed to "con
67
structive" scholarship. The former seeks only to convey something of the
writer, to explain what the writer is thinking about. "Constructive" work,
by contrast, seeks at a minimum to provide guidance of a more or less con
crete nature-Le., to show that some particular avenue is more desirable
than another. 68
The problem, then, is that constructive scholarship cannot possibly
proceed without problematic underlying assumptions. That is, constructive
scholarship depends on the usefulness and availability of at least some
absolutes. This dependency is problematic because it requires the scholar
sooner or later to face nihilism. Edifying scholarship doesn't necessarily
share this problem-like poets or painters, edifying scholars don't need to
worry about problematic ex ante assumptions because they have no concern
with absolutes. 69
However, we are still by our nature left with a sense that constructive
scholarship is something we should be able to do, and that it is needed. And,
currently at least, edifying scholarship is not of much use to law schools.
We are still quite preoccupied with figuring out what courts and legislatures
should do. Therefore, I think that the concern for absolutes is much more
than just banal or unduly picky; their absence, I think impugns basically all
of our intellectual projects.
B.

Transcendental Arguments

A very old criticism of doubt is one sometimes known as the "tran
scendental paradox" or "principle of noncontradiction." The claim is that
one cannot make an argument that contradicts itself. The agnostic claim
may seem to violate this rule because if one says, "There is no objective
truth," the doubter has oxymoronically made a claim about something that
he thinks is true. In other words, it is said that there must be some tran
scendental truth underlying the claim because any claim about the world
necessarily contains a claim that at least one thing is true. Aristotle first
67.

68.

See RORTY, supra note 12, at 357-60 & n.4.
See id.

69.
It is not entirely clearly how this sort of scholarship would work, but, at a minimum,
the edifying scholar must be prepared to live with internal self-contradiction. That is, the scholar
must appreciate that humans can't do anything without beliefs and a deep, quiet metaphysics
facts that are at odds with the agnostic critique. I have done my best to accommodate that
appreciation in this very Essay.
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raised this argument. 70 The noncontradiction argument has turned up in
numerous places elsewhere. 71
I think this argument in its various forms is incorrect as applied to
agnosticism, as opposed to skepticism as I define the term, and therefore not
really relevant to my main claim. Because agnosticism is only an epistemic
claim, 72 I say nothing about truth, only about our access to it if in fact it
exists. Furthermore, the claim is not bound up with the metaphysical issue
of its own truth, for as I have already noted, it does not matter if agnosti,
cism is not "true."73 Thus, agnosticism states neither element necessary to
the noncontradiction argument-the claim that nothing is true, on the one
hand, or that agnosticism is true, on the other. The noncontradiction cri,
tique, therefore, is actually aimed at a claim I do not make-a claim about
truth.
At this point this argument probably seems a little sophistical. After
all, my whole view rests on a claim that I will make no attempt to prove
as if I am saying th(lt agnosticism is right and also possibly wrong. But on
the contrary, not only is this argument not just a trick; I think it uncovers
one of the most important insights of the doubtful view. It is the very
nature of the agnostic enterprise to proceed in life and decision making
without deciding questions of truth and falsity.
It will be useful, I think, to examine precisely what it means to say
"agnosticism is right and also possibly wrong." The words right and wrong in
that sentence do not refer to two poles on the same continuum, but rather
reflect quite different properties. To be "right" means that agnosticism is a
useful compromise with our circumstances-in fact it is a sort of default
position, a view of our situation that at present makes sense of our experi,
ence. Therefore, "right" in this sense means only that agnosticism is a
passive, circumspect admission of epistemic limits, which has no regard for
whether there are better epistemic approaches on the horizon. It does not
mean that agnosticism is an active truth claim or an ontological "real."
"Wrong," by contrast, is a statement of ontological certainty-that is, a
claim that there is an objective truth about our capacity for perception that
is true whether we can prove it yet or not. Obviously, to deny this latter
claim-to say that agnosticism cannot be wrong-would be directly at odds
with the basic claim of agnosticism, and thus would violate the principle of
70.
See ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, bk. f, ch. 4, at 59-64 (Hippocrates G. Apostle
trans., 1979).
See A.C. Grayling, Epistemology, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY
71.
53-58 (Nicholas Bunnin & E.P. Tsui·James eds., 1996) (summarizing various approaches).
See supra note 3.
72.
73.
See supra note 3.
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noncontradiction just as its proponent argues. However, as I have said, the
agnostic does not make such a claim. This is so for the same reason that the
agnostic is not an atheist-for to dispute a claim is the same mistake as to
accept it.
The noncontradiction argument is a perceptive critique when it is
aimed at the proper target. I think it effectively undermines skepticism or
ontological antirealism, at least so long as the skeptic or antirealist has no
explanation for her inability to avoid self-contradiction. Because I make no
ontological claims whatsoever, however, the argument just misses the mark.

C.

Michael Moore, His Ilk, and the Theology of the Right Answer

While some legal scholars have set forth metaphysically real models of
morals or views of law implying some metaphysical reality, surprisingly few
of them have focused with any care on the epistemic issues thereby raised.
Surprising, I say, because in my view such a focus is necessary for them.
One could hardly ground a philosophy on the belief that there are real
answers to our problems without also believing that we have the. epistemic
firepower to find them. Metaphysical claims of this . nature are fairly
implied, if not made explicitly, in all natural-law scholarship, by its very
nature, in any sort of formalistic positivism that anticipates right
applications of rules, and elsewhere. I consider these various philosophies
to contain radically unresolved problems of epistemology, even conceding
arguendo their metaphysical commitments.
Michael Moore, for example, is a self-styled metaphysical realist and
74
has written at length about the existence and usefulness of "moral reals."
While he has set out warehouse categorizations of the various doubtful posi
75
tions and what he perceives to be their problems, he has really only raised
76
the handful of arguments I deal with here-the reductio, a transcendental
77
argument, and so on. One of Moore's most curious and unfulfilling argu
ments-and one common of realist writing-is his simple, table-thumping
insistence that we do actually have access to real. morals. He claims that
agnosticism is "inconsistent with our daily experience [because w]e often
seem to be giving reasons justifying our moral judgments. Indeed, a moral
judgment seems to carry with it the expectation that there are good reasons
74.
See Moore, supra note 9; Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58
S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1985); Moore, supra note 18.
75.
See, e.g., Moore, supra note 9; Moore, supra note 18.
76.
See Moore, supra note 74, at 310 (stating that doubters are subject to a "conceptual
schizophrenia"-they are unable to adhere to their doubts when simply living their private lives).
For my arguments regarding the reductio, see infra Part III.
77.
See Moore, supra note 74, at310-l l.
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sufficient to justify it." 78 I hardly even feel a need to respond because I can
merely point out that (1) to me it does not seem that way, and ( 2) the fact
that it seems that way to Moore just does not prove anything.
Similarly, Ronald Dworkin has set forth what is in essence a natural
law model, or perhaps a legal positivism composed of really compelling and
79
identifiable rules, but he does not directly face epistemic issues. He quite
notoriously sets out his technique for finding "right" answers-which he
apparently assumes to have some degree of ontological reality-without
direct consideration either of the metaphysical issues thereby raised or,
more problematically, the epistemic ones.80 Thus, whether or not there is
such a thing as "rightness," it remains unclear how we logically prove such a
thing. Dworkin's more recent model of interpretation-that is, of finding
81
the law -is elegant and compelling in its own right, but it still begs epis
temic issues.

III.

THE ILLOGIC OF THE REDUCTIO

As I mentioned, it has been much more common for legal academics
to face doubt through the very practical reductio than by way of careful
analytical argument. That is, it has been easier to say that doubtful views
lead to awkward or seemingly impossible outcomes, and therefore must be
untrue. This is natural, I think; when one arrives at the point described in
Part I-the sense that there is no means by which to guide life or policy
through philosophy-the awkward problems of nihilism are exposed in
sharp detail. The natural reaction is to search for some means to overcome
our predicament. Thus, there has been a great tendency amongst nonag
nostics to view nihilism as the very reason that doubt must' be "wrong."
As I note in the Introduction, I think it is important to deal with these
problems separately from the arguments faced in the last part because I
think it is these very visceral reactions that explain .the general dislike for
doubt, rather than any reasoned philosophy, and because they are much
more powerful than the latter. Furthermore, I think it is often these reac
tions that actually drive the more sophisticated arguments discussed in Part
II-that is, various scholars have constructed arguments not for the
arguments' own sake, but in order to give reputable vent to their intuitive,
reductio-based feelings.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Moore, supra note 18, at 1072-73.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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As an example of a typical reductio, agnostic philosophies are often
82
said to be immoral. Whenever a person publicly espouses agnostic views,
some eavesdropping metaphysical realist or a person otherwise nondoubtful
about something will invariably come over and say, "Oh yeah, well .what
about the Nazis? Don't you believe they were bad?" or "Isn't it obvious that
murder is bad?" or the like.83 That is, someone will pose the predictable
devils of moral relativism and solipsism-or, put more generally, nihilism.
The realist smiles knowingly, for the squirming agnostic is now in a seem
ingly impossible trap. The agnostic fumbles and hesitates because, in order
to maintain the integrity of his agnostic views, he seemingly must admit
that the Nazis may not have been bad, or whatever. Thus, both the agnos
tic and the realist know that the reductio of rigorous agnosticism is utter
subjectivity. Similar reductio arguments can be raised on grounds other
than the immorality of doubt-for example, that doubt must be faulty
because it leads us to the conclusion that physics is hopelessly subjective.
The realist goes on to argue that because doubt has brought us to nihilism,
the agnostic has failed.
The first and, to me, the most obvious response is that the argument is
simply a non sequitur. Doubt may lead to nihilism, it is true; but so what if
it does? After all, even if nihilism is "bad" (which is not obvious), what if it
is inescapable? If agnosticism is a proper or even only an as-yet insur
mountable epistemic view, then nihilism is the human condition, and
should be faced for what it is rather than hidden from by means of clever
arguments or constructions.
Furthermore, the reductio claim, if you think about it, begs a deep, sub
tle, and especially interesting question. The nonagnostic seems to hold that
there should be some correlation between our visceral reactions to events
and the world around us. This, too, is a non sequitur. The problem I think,
is that our perceptions of the world are complex and unsystematic. If our
82.
See, e.g., DUXBURY, supra note 5, at 422-23; Joel F. Handler, Postmodemism, Protest,
and the New Social Movements, 26 L. & SOC'Y REV. 697 (1992); Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism
About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714 (1994); Patterson, supra
note 9, at 20-21.
83.
See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 79, at 84-85.
[The agnostic) cannot reserve his skepticism for some quiet philosophical moment, and
press his own opinions about the morality of slavery, for example, ... when he is off duty
and only acting in the ordinary way. He has given up his distinction between ordinary
and objective opinions; if he really believes ... that no moral judgment is really better
than any other, he cannot then add that in his opinion slavery is unjust.
Id.; Moore, supra note 74, at 310 ("[Agnostics suffer from) a kind of conceptual schizophrenia:
when writing they propound subjectivist epistemology, but when it comes to daily living they
make judgments and decisions as we all do: presupposing the existence of tables, chairs, and right
answers to hard moral dilemmas and legal cases.").
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reactions are nothing more than ad hoc emotions rather than observations
of ontological reals, then the observation that some things seem "bad" or
"good" does not mean anything per se. For example, the realist will raise a
typical reductio, like "Oh, come on, you must believe that slavery is bad."
The agnostic will admit that that seems right, and may even admit that the
seeming rightness of the statement is not historically contingent-that is,
that slavery seems to have been "bad" even at those times when many peo
ple thought that it was not. The problem is that the realist cannot draw
any generalizable principle from that visceral sense that some human prac
tice is "bad." In precise terms, what we mean by our gut-reaction claim that
"slavery is bad" is not that it is bad-as if the word has some clearly defined
meaning on which we all agree-but that "I wish it hadn't happened,'' "The
suffering of the victims was a disgrace,'' "The arrogance of the slave owners
infuriates me," and so on. We feel a cluster of dimly outlined, nonsystem
atic emotions about this act. But we cannot identify a core principle or
principles that explain why slavery is "bad" or that tell us anything about
what "badness" is. Thus, even if we could arrive at a more rigorous explana
tion of why slavery is bad, it would not help us to understand when other
things are bad-it would not lead us to any theoretical explanation of good
and bad. Moreover, even those seemingly meaningful sensations of right
and wrong we experience in the face of situations like slavery or nazism are
present only at extremes. Yes, of course, most of us feel that slavery and
nazism and so on are bad. But we clearly share no agreement on virtually
anything but these extremes. Pornography, abortion, welfare, government·
spending decisions, what to have for dinner, etc.; no uniform consensus
could possibly be formed on such issues or any of the infinite range of other
issues that are not "extreme." 84
Let me emphasize the I do not believe that the seemingly irrefutable
sensations we experience at these extremes mean that we are privy to some
transcendental values made manifest at points of extremity. That would
simply be the reductio restated. And I am certainly not interested in the
context of this discussion in what should be thought of as bad or not. The
only matter of significance for my purposes is the epistemic nature of
these sensations-what is going on beneath the surface and whether the
mere fact of these sensations proves anything about reality or our ability to

84.
It is worth noting that we do not all agree on even the extremes, suggesting that there
is no core substance of "badness" in even the most extreme acts, unless we are prepared to say that
anyone who disagrees with us on these points must themselves be bad or crazy. Some people
currently experience ambivalence about abortion, for example, while to others the question is
clear-cut.
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perceive it. The point for me is that there is no principled substance to our
visceral reactions to events, at least as far as the reductio can prove.
The reductio begs another question. The argument seems to be that
our emotional reactions cannot be inconsistent with our true epistemic
nature. That is, if a feeling we have about something presupposes a certain
epistemic ability, then the fact that we have the feeling means that we have
that ability. Thus, the realist seems to be saying that because the agnostic
cannot comfortably deny that nazism was wrong, that inability betrays the
agnostic's own inner commitment to a sort of epistemic power that provides
useful answers. But what if we simply cannot make ourselves conform to our
own epistemic nature? Is it impossible that our willingness to believe in
things is simply the result of our complex and contradictory nature?
In my view, our inability to deny every proposition-a task that the
reductio always demands of the agnostic-is not a failure of doubt as a philo
sophical commitment, but is simply the result of our limitations as humans.
In a simple world, the agnostic would believe in nothing and would indulge
luxuriously in entertaining every possibility. In real life, this luxury always
seems beyond reach, for even the most diligent agnostic finds it impossible
to discard every belief. For example, we cannot consistently maintain dis
belief that, as our feet fall before us, we will continue to meet solid earth, or
that our friends are who they appear to be, or that if the police catch us
committing a crime we will regret it, or whatever. Shedding all of our
beliefs seems just as impossible as conceptualizing infinity, for we operate on
a daily basis by using a seemingly infinite number of beliefs.85 Therefore,
the practkal limitations of our human minds demand that we use some
device to free us from the infinite range of possibility. Our device is belief.
Furthermore, even the agnostic wants to believe-after all, everyone
experiences foxhole religion when times are bad. It is simply natural, for
whatever reason, that we strive for answers and explanations. The fact that
the human mind is incapable of shedding all its various beliefs, however,
does not prove either that there are extra-human values or moral rules, just
out there somewhere, or that we should look for some regularizing principles,
whether "real," or merely agreed upon. It is foolish to believe that just
because we cannot conceive of some possibility then it must not be possible.
For example, in calculus, we learn that we cannot visualize an asymptotic
function ever reaching its limit-we imagine the asymptotic curve just
reaching forever nearer the limit (which is in fact the case-"forever" and
85.
This. tracks Hume's observation. See DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING
HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, essay XII, pt. I (P.H. Nidditch ed., 1978) (1748). I think this is also
what Holmes was getting at with his "can't helps." See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32
HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918).
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"never" are two ways of saying the same thing)-and yet the possibility of

reaching the limit through infinite iterations is exploited throughout calcu
lus and physics.
Finally, note again that the reductio can be raised by the nonagnostic
with respect to any subject the agnostic can doubt, moral or otherwise. The
nonagnostic can say, for example, "Oh, come on, your view would mean
that physics is subjective," or "Agnosticism must mean that Neil Armstrong
didn't walk on the moon," or whatever. I have used the moral examples in
the text above only because they are often raised, and they put the issue
plainly in sight. My view is simply that the reductio, no matter what subject
is on the table, always fails for the reasons I have explained. It is a non
sequitur, to begin with, and it begs important epistemic questions.

IV.

DEFANGING DOUBT

Even doubters seem to fear doubt. It is hard to imagine how we can go
on without the prospect of at least some knowledge or useful belief at the
end of the tunnel. This fear quite obviously drives the reductio, and I think
it also drives the general search by even agnostics for ways to overcome
doubt. But I think a better approach, once doubt is accepted as a necessary
consequence of our human limitations, is to absolve nihilism of its negative
connotation. And here, I think, is what this Essay is fundamentally about:
Doubt has been rejected not because it is bad, but because it is difficult.
Therefore, the key to resolving that difficulty does not lie in proving doubt
wrong. Rather, the key is to recognize that the problem with nihilism is not
nihilism itself. The problem is a set of anterior assumptions we maintain
about what we need to be able to accomplish as a species to be successful.
In particular, we harbor two major misconceptions that, in my opin
ion, drive our fear of doubt. I think both problems can be dispelled with a
little effort. First of all, it seems intuitive that the failure of objective
morality will lead to anarchy and mayhem. Without a moral compass, poli
tics and personal choices seem hopeless. Second, it seems that if we cannot
come up with ways to explain the world simply, human progress will halt.
That is, our technology, our government, our legal system, and so on all
seem to require that we be able to explain the world about us, or else we
might as well just fumble around in chaos. I discuss each problem in turn.
A.

The Politics of Doubt

Perhaps the most perplexing question is whether one can embrace
agnosticism. and yet know right from wrong or evaluate social conditions, or
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the like. The agnostic must admit that morality is subjective on her
account and is thus indeterminate as guidance for real-world behavior.
Thus, one is left to wonder: Is agnosticism a license to steal or kill or rape?
The essential agnostic response to this problem must be a practical
one, and it again capitalizes on the nonagnostic's confusion of epistemology
with ontology. The basic doubtful claim is about what humans can do as
thinkers and knowers-it is epistemic. It is unconcerned with what exists
beyond the human mind. For all the agnostic cares, there may be some set
. of real morals floating around out in space, but it doesn't matter because we
simply can't make determinate sense of them. In this way, the agnostic is in
fact quite humble. Moral questions are left unanswered not because the
agnostic is a bad person, but because she distrusts her own ability to resolve
such questions for others. This is again like the difference between agnosti
cism and atheism. For to claim that murder, for example, is acceptable
would be an ontological claim about morals-the sort of claim the agnostic
shuns. Indeed, the claims of realists and other nonagnostics-including
moral claims about right and wrong behavior-seem by contrast unduly
arrogant.
Thus, in the matter of individual morality, we are left to fend for our
selves. The reductio again arises at this point-if we are constrained by no
morals, then the world is anarchy. People are free to behave as they choose.
But, as far as I am concerned, this should not be so troubling. I think moral
philosophies have been no constraint in any event; in fact they seem to be
of little real-world significance (in no small measure because academia is
generally inaccessible to the public). Those who are disposed to act in ways
harmful to others will do so whether or not we can identify ontologically
real morals, those who are not so disposed will not. To the extent that
some of us do not feel individually constrained from acting in ways harmful
to others, much of that harm is captured in criminal and tort law.
But then one must wonder: if no act is "bad," then why have criminal
or tort laws? And, on the other hand, if we have no such law will we not
live in a world of chaos? The answer, I think, is that we have criminal and
tort, and other law not because it is right, but because it seems necessary.
That is, even though we don't know how to make criminal law properly, to
the extent that this means making a criminal law informed by the proper
principles, we are still motivated by animal need to control events that
threaten us. After all, murders and rapes and so on do occur, and they are
fairly unambiguously "bad" for the victims. Thus, we are and always have
been motivated by visceral notions of real-world necessity. If we had to
start from scratch, we would presumably attempt to prevent at least
"extreme" behavior such as murder and rape and other acts that cause suf
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fering. Thus, we have developed an incremental, entropic, probably path
dependent set of constraints on behavior over a very long period of time.
That in itself, however, does not mean that criminal or tort law reflect any
principled notion of right and wrong. Certainly, no one could convincingly
identify an underlying normative scheme in a body of rules like our own
criminal law, such that the law could be said to reflect a particular con
ception of morality.
In response to the fear that criminal, tort, or other law does not cap
ture some behaviors we find threatening, I turn to a famous paper written
many years ago by Christopher Alexander. He explained that the world
simply may work in ways that the human mind cannot robustly explain. 86
Alexander, who was an architect, wrote about the generally poor fit
between planned cities-that is, cities designed from sci:atch by urban
planners-and the everyday needs of the people for whom they were built.
He explained that humans tend to order their perceptions of phenomena
according to rigid, categorical systems. He thought that these systems did
not correspond very well to the organization of the external world-which
was a web of perhaps infinitely complex and haphazard interrelationships
and that this tension accounted for the inadequacy of planned cities.
Alexander wrote that organic (as opposed to planned) cities are the
residue of life. The haphazard scatter of buildings, streets, homes, and busi
nesses, and so on is the result of people placing things where they need
them, incrementally, over time. I think that "organic" tort and criminal
law can similarly be seen as the residue of living, real-world disputes. Like
planned cities, "planned" legal doctrine-a body of rigid, theoretically con
sistent decision rules formed in the abstract-would be ill-suited to the
needs of real-world litigants. The implication for this Essay is that law, like
urban development, has and will work out passably well, and even when it
works out in ways that are disappointing to us, it is unlikely that we could
do better by some ex ante theoretical planning. Thus, while it might be
good if we could theorize law and legal phenomena, or infuse our criminal
or tort law with guiding values to produce "right" outcomes, we can't, so we
should probably not worry about it so much and focus on what we can do.
Thus, although nihilism may leave us in a state of some anxiety about our
hope to control threatening events, I suspect that whatever systematic
attempts we make to protect ourselves, we will be left with substantially
similar threats.

86.
See Christopher Alexander, A Ciry ls Not a Tree, ARCHITECTURAL FORUM, Apr.
1965, at 58.
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It is interesting that those who express the most radical doubts are
often those who seem most worried by them and most diligently in search of
humane solutions. Joseph Singer, for example, has written that even
though "[l]aw and morality have no rational foundation," we should not be
troubled because "[t]he lack of a rational foundation to legal reasoning does
not prevent us from developing passionate moral and political commit
ments."87 Whether or not one accepts the logic by which he reaches this
conclusion, the important thing is that he goes on to provide a particularly
thoughtful and compassionate list of tasks that he believes a society must
perform, notwithstanding the underlying relativity of morals. These
include prevention of cruelty, alleviation of misery, and democratization of
illegitimate hierarchies. 88 Similarly, Balkin thinks the answer to nihilism
lies in transcendental values that flow from the "wellsprings of the human
soul"89-values that would support, among other things, defense of the
weak. On the other hand, it's pretty difficult to find serious agnostic schol
arship advocating rape or pillage or what have you.
Finally, the apparent conservatism of doubt raises fears in some minds
of a macropolitical nature. It seems that we can hardly protect ourselves
from tyrants and mass abominations and so on if we have no mass con
sciousness about right and wrong-doubt seems to leave us intellectually
defenseless against evil. If another Hitler comes along, what will the agnos
tic do? Acquiesce, because resistance cannot be said to be "Right"?
Well, no. In fact, in a certain sense, principle itself is the very culprit.
Evil principles can stir the masses just as can other principles. Hider, I
might point out, did not inflame the Nazis with doubt, but with ideals.
Indeed, it often seems that bizarre and malevolent prescriptions flow not
from agnostic distrust of theory, but from principled theories. Witness
Judge Posner's apparently erstwhile view that, as a consequence of his
detailed and systematic economic conception of justice, people who are so
mentally feeble as to be unable to support themselves should be left to die. 90
Oddly enough, a major purpose of Posner's The Economics ofJustice was
to overcome this very criticism as applied to an early precursor of the eco
nomic analysis of law-the utilitarian theory of Jeremy Bentham. Like
Posner, Bentham set up an ostensibly principled political philosophy
he argued that society should take whichever course maximizes aggregate
"happiness." It was precisely this principle, however, that led Bentham to
claims that today smack of great cruelty-for example, that all beggars
87.
88.
89.
90.

Singer, supra note 10, at 8-9.
See id. at 67--68.
Balkin, supra note 43, at 1139.
See POSNER, supra note 59, at 76.
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should be imprisoned because their loss of happiness would be outweighed
91
by the gain in happiness to those who object to the sight of beggars.
The point is that principles are, in the agnostic view, of dubious value.
Much evil in history can be blamed on them; I for one think that evil
principles can be attacked as effectively through the agnostic's visceral,
atheoretical, personal sense of right and wrong as through any principled
92
response.
B.

The Structure of Doubt and the Mismatch of Theory and Reality

Our belief in the necessity of explaining things exposes perhaps the
most interesting and illuminating implication of the entire debate. We
constantly search for theories to explain social phenomena, even though it is
not at all clear that we live in a world amenable to theories. It seems to me
that that particular human quality is potentially the key to understanding
our fear of doubt and suggests ways to free nihilism from its hopeless cast.
As mentioned above, a theory is an attempt to use the world's redun
93
dancy to explain the world simply. But there is reason to believe that, at
least in areas of social science concern, the redundancies we seek either do
not exist or, at least, when they do exist their complexity places them
beyond our reach as tools to explain the world. This is a matter of some
concern, for there is a perception that academia has a duty to the laity, a
duty of guidance and advice on issues of academic specialty. Thus, if our
theories fail as useful guides for life and policy, it seems that the lay public
has been cast adrift to fumble around at its own peril. It seems, then, that
the world is in a pretty sorry state. In this regard, I again turn to Alexander
and his view that we cannot adequately control the world about us by way
of ex ante ordering. For that reason, I think it is really only academics who
are in such a state. Nihilism only seems bad because of the emphasis we
place on theory. But, in fact, it has nothing to do with the external world;
it impugns our purely intellectual projects, but not necessarily anything
else. The world seems to get along without falling apart, even though we
cannot for the life of us seem to come up with robust explanations of things.
Are we seriously to believe that the difference between natural law and

91.
See Jeremy Bentham, Tracts on Poor Laws and Pauper Management, in 8 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 361, 401 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843). See generally
POSNER, supra note 59, at 31-47.
92.
Rorty makes a similar point. See RORTY, supra note 4, at 53 (arguing that the Nazis
could not have been opposed by way of reason, by showing them that "freedom" is a superior value
to their own).
93.
See supra Part I.
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positivism, for example, ever made any difference to the world at large ?94 Is
there any reason to believe that important decision makers pay any atten
tion to jurisprudence or legal theory generally? Indeed, an important
insight of modem doubtful scholarship has been that, even though legal
scholarship justifies itself as a service to lawyers and judges, it seems that,
95
in fact, no one is listening. And if even those decision makers trained in
the law are not listening, there is hardly any reason to believe that legal
scholarship could have any significant influence on the world outside the
academy.
Thus, the fear that we will not be able to get along because we are not
able to explain things is probably not worth worrying about. In fact, for
what it is worth, I think it is arrogant in a sense to assume that we can
explain the world in any useful way. Our real hope lies simply in living in
the world and working as thinkers and doers without the possibility of
robust generalizable explanations. And, frankly, I think it should be fairly
obvious that that is something we already know how to do. Charles
Lindblom, for example, many years ago set out a very compelling model of
decision making in which the actor is forced to make do with limited
resources, time, and epistemic capacity. 96

V.

CONSEQUENCES

Pierre Schlag explains that the legal academy has long sustained itself
on the metaphor of the court of appeals judge as the law professor's alter
97
ego. That is, the traditional explanation of the value of legal scholarship
has been that it aids the appellate bench by clarifying doctrinal issues and
providing guidance for their proper resolution. Even now, at a time when
so-called doctrinal scholarship has all but disappeared, the general belief
persists (although perhaps it is waning) that the basic purpose of scholarly
inquiry and debate is to influence legal outcomes. Even as this particular
self-image of the law professor fades, the strange law school culture it
94.
I choose this example, of course, because legal philosophers have thought the distinc
tion makes a very big difference in the real world-witness the Hart-Fuller debate. See Lon
L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958);
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
Although Hart, Fuller, and others have thought this distinction important, many others since
have called it irrelevant. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 26, at 228-39 (arguing that the "lawful
ness" of the Nuremburg tribunal, the nub of the conflict between Hart and Fuller, was
meaningless).
95.
See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 60, at 406-07; Schlag, supra note 45, at 419.
96.
See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79
(1959). Highly recommended.
97.
See Schlag, supra note 45, at 420.
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engendered remains. In the classroom, we proceed under an unspoken
assumption of determinacy that no one really believes-not even the
students, most of the time-but that we recognize as necessary in order to
98
Once in practice, lawyers relax the
talk aboJ.It doctrine coherently .
assumption greatly in order to serve their clients, proceeding generally on a
sort of Holmesian-prediction approach to law. Thus, "pragmatism is the
99
implicit working theory of most good lawyers." However, it is not the
working theory of the law school or most legal scholarship. I think this fact
may be explained by the need of legal scholars to justify their project.
Thus, one final fear remains surrounding nihilism, and I think it
largely explains the opposition to agnosticism in the legal academy. It is
this: If agnosticism is the best that we can do as humans, then nonagnostic
legal scholarship begins to seem quite banal. If legal theory cannot make
"better" law or produce determinate outcomes, then it seems that the study
of law is hardly its own intellectual pursuit, and law schools become (or
perhaps should become) mere vocational academies for the training of
technicians-a frightening prospect for many in the academy. It is inher
ently demoralizing to imagine that one's own work is not of significance
beyond the walls of the law school. Indeed, as has been explained
repeatedly elsewhere, our modern conception of law as a regular, theorizable
phenomenon seems to have originated in part in Dean Langdell's fear that
law cannot be studied as an independent discipline and thus has no place in
.
. 100
the umvers1ty.
But, again, it seems to me that this fear is merely the product of unre
alistic expectations for human capacity to theorize about social phenomena.
98.
As Paul Campos writes of his own experience in the Classroom:
Before the tables, elevated and exposed, the gatekeeper of the law grasps both sides of a
narrow lectern.... [T]he texts he wields with such apparent confidence are thought to
contain nothing less than the law itself.... (O]ne question reverberates repeatedly to
every corner of the classroom: Is this case correctly decided? The students hesitate, stum
ble, prevaricate. "On the one hand ...." The gatekeeper favors them with an indulgent
smile. Yet beneath that smile, beneath that confident manner, a remorseful conscience,
agenbite of inwit, eats away at his soul. For in all truth, the gatekeeper has come to
know that he does not even understand his own question.
Paul F. Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotext, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2178, 2178 (1996).
99.
Grey, supra note 4, at 1590.
100.
See Schlag, supra note 45. Dean Langdell said that
1 have tried to do my part towards making the teaching and the study of law in that
school worthy of a university .... To accomplish these objects, so far as they depended
upon the law school, it was indispensable to establish at least two things-that law is a
science, and that all the available materials of that science are contained in printed
books.
Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW Q. REV. ll8, 123-24
(1887), quoted in Schlag, supra note 45, at 419.
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It is the Langdellian emulation of the physical sciences that Friedrich
August von Hayek long ago called the mistake of "scientism"-a belief that
101
the social sciences can and should be modeled on the hard sciences. The
danger, he thought, was in believing that
what looks superficially like the most scientific procedure is often the
most unscientific ... in these fields there are definite limits to what
we can expect science to achieve [because when] essential complex
ity of an organized kind prevails, [we] cannot acquire the full knowl
102
edge which would make mastery of the events possible.

Hayek thought that our best alternative was "to use what knowledge [we] can
achieve, not to shape the results as the craftsman shapes his handiwork, but
rather to cultivate a growth by providing the appropriate environment, in
the manner in which the gardener does for his plants." 103
Hayek was writing about the econometric study of economic phenom
ena-a sophisticated and highly routinized application of statistical theory.
Thus, he felt that even rigorously quantitative social science cannot hope
to be more than rhetorical. Similarly, it could be said that the hard sciences
are essentially rhetorical, insofar as they rely on arguments that the human
links in their chains of proofs and inferences are not faulty. Human scien
tists run tests, interpret data, and formulate underlying hypotheses. Thus,
no science can fully overcome our own weaknesses as humans. We should
expect no more from legal scholarship. Legal theory, like theory in other
disciplines, is at best a rhetorical tool; however, the fact that it may never
render determinate answers to concrete controversies is not necessarily of
such great significance.
Thus, the problems of nihilism do not mean that we should throw out
the scholarly baby with the nonagnostic bathwater. I have sought in this
Essay to show that the consequence of our doubtful existence-nihilism-is
just not so bad; it is okay to doubt. Consider again the physical sciences. It
seems to me that physics and chemistry are ultimately only arguments,
though arguments for which we can amass a great deal of convincing evi
dence. Nevertheless, we operate in the physical world by way of powerful
and sophisticated technology. Thus, while we can't be sure if some proposi
tion of physics is right, we can rest easy that a bridge built on physical the
101.
See Friederich August von Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, in THE EssENCE OF
HAYEK 266, 266-67 (Chiaki Nishiyama & Kurt R. Leube eds., 1984) (quoting Friedrich August
von Hayek, Scientism and the Study of Society, 9 ECONOMICA 267 (1942)).
102.
Id. at 272-73.
103.
Id. at 276. In a similar context, Herbert Hove.nkamp argues that economic theory "is
rhetorical: we use it to tell consistent and relevant stories that make sense out of the world we
face." HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE 74 (1994) (arguing about the proper role of economic theory in antitrust law).
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ory is still a bridge and we can drive our cars across it. Law, I think, bears a
relationship to philosophy similar to the relationship between engineering
and physics. The bridge might collapse because the theory underlying its
construction was inadequate to the real-world circumstances that arose; fur
thermore, bridges will always collapse sometimes. It does not follow,
though, that we should stop making bridges.
In summary, I think the agnostic view results in three related conclu
sions. First of all, notwithstanding nihilism, I think we potentially can do
104
what Rorty calls "edifying" scholarship. Hannah Arendt expressed the idea
somewhat differently when she noted:
[T)hinking is always result-less. That is the difference between
"philosophy" and science: Science has results, philosophy never.
Thinking starts after an experience of truth has struck home, so to
speak.... This notion that truth is the result of thought is very old
and goes back to ancient classical philosophy, possibly to Socrates
himself. If I am right and it is a fallacy, then it probably is the oldest
105
fallacy of Wes tern philosophy .

On the other hand, to the extent that the reader hopes for a means of
doing constructive scholarship without problematic assumptions, this Essay is
a failure. One cannot set out to find answers without tangling with the
nasty problems of nihilism and, as I have explained, I don't think we can
tangle with nihilism.
However, that observation leads me to what I consider the basic
purpose of this Essay: the preceding failure just does not matter that much.
This is so, I submit, because the agnostic's "failure" is not the result of
weaknesses in his argument, but of our particular epistemic circumstances.
That being the case, our best option is not to sit around and moan about
it, but to take what we have and make the best of it.
This, then, is the real, underlying essence of the agnostic observation,
which is at once frustrating and transcendently edifying: philosophers cannot
explain everything. I think there probably are real things we can do in the
real world-like policy making and personal decisions-we just don't know
how to describe them on paper. From one point of view, I imagine, this
observation probably seems like yet another failure. I have done my best,
however, to show in these pages that it is a success.
104.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text. See generally RORTY, supra note 12, at
357-72.
105.
Letter from Hannah Arendt to Mary McCarthy (Aug. 20, 1954), in BETWEEN FRIENDS:
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF HANNAH ARENDT AND MARY MCCARTHY 1949-1975, at 24-25
(Carol Brightman ed., 1995), quoted in David Luban, What's Pragmatic About Legal Pragmatism?,
18 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 52 (1996).

500

46 UCLA LAW REVIEW 461 (1998)

Thus, I envision a sort of compromise. I think that scholarly research
and debate should continue, but under more realistic expectations of what
humans can accomplish. In particular, we should get over our fetish for
objectivity and determinacy; they would be very useful if we could find
them, but, in the meanwhile, it seems that our search for them has been
wasteful and somewhat foolish. Most importantly, fears about doubt should
be let go. At this point in our intellectual history, they seem simply naive,
and we should bid farewell to the days when legal scholars were ostracized
for questioning the objectivity of morality or the possibility of right legal
outcomes. I think the chief benefit of such a compromise will be greater
humility in academic discourse. Humility could bring an end to unrealistic
claims to knowledge that seem in many ways harmful.
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